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TORTS - COVENANT NOT TO SUE AS BAR TO
ACTION AGAINST OTHER JOINT TORT-FEASORS
Plaintiff was injured in a collision between a train operated by
the Railway Company and a tractor operated by defendant. In
consideration of $3,500 plaintiff executed under seal an instrument
covenanting not to prosecute any action against the Railway Com-
pany for damages based on his injuries. The instrument stated,
"It is expressly understood that this instrument is a covenant not
to sue and not a release. The undersigned expressly reserves the
right to an action . . . against (defendant) . . ." By special plea
in bar, defendant contended that the instrument served to release
not only the Railway Company but also himself as a joint tort-
feasor. The trial court sustained the plea. On appeal, held, affirmed.
The distinction recognized in many jurisdictions between a covenant
not to sue and a release is ill founded. What is important is that
plaintiff effected an accord and satisfaction with one tort-feasor
which should serve to extinguish his claim against others responsi-
ble for his injuries. Shortt v. Hudson Supply Co., 191 Va. 306,
60 S. E. 2d 900 (1950).
It is familiar law that the release of one joint tort-feasor releases
the others jointly liable for the same wrong. This is a proposition
with which the Virginia court has long been in accord.' But many
courts have added the qualification that such a release is not the
release of all where in that release rights have been expressly
reserved against other tort-feasors, either in the instrument 2 or
where, aside from the instrument, such appears to have been the
intention of the parties.' Where the instrument contains a covenant
not to sue one joint tort-feasor, as distinguished from a release, the
great weight of authority holds that other tort-feasors are not
released. This also is true whether reservation of rights against the
others is contained in the instrument' or is shown by parol evidence
to have been the intention of the parties.' Finally, some courts have
construed a release with reservations as tantamount to a covenant
not to sue, and have allowed later suit accordingly.'
Where the instrument is given effect as a covenant not to sue
one of two or more joint tort-feasors, it is usually held that the
covenant serves to bar suit against no one, but that if sued, the one
to whom the covenant has been given may institute collateral suit
for breach of the covenant.7 But other courts, desiring to avoid
circuity of action, have allowed the covenant to be pleaded in defense
to the original action, a seemingly desirable rule.'
It has been recognized for many years that Virginia is a juris-
diction which looks with disfavor upon later suit after an apparent
discharge of one of two or more joint tort-feasors. In the leading
case of Ruble v. Turner,9 the plaintiff had been assaulted by several
wrongdoers, to one of whom he later gave a written instrument
evidencing a settlement between them in "satisfaction for the part"
that party had played in the assault. The instrument expressly
reserved plaintiff's rights against the defendant. Nevertheless the
court held defendant's plea of accord and satisfaction to be a valid
defense, saying, "when satisfaction is made, like a valuable consid-
eration in a deed, it gives effect to the instrument; and satisfaction
being received from one of the joint trespassers, shall discharge
the whole .. ."o10 Speaking of the attempted reservation of the
right to sue the other joint tort-feasors, the court stated. "the
proviso in this case is void, as being contrary to the policy of the
law and the nature of the transaction."
' '
The principle that release of one joint tort-feasor with reservation
of rights against others nevertheless releases all, has been repeated
by the Virginia court numerous times, 12 while Ruble v: Turner was
being criticized elsewhere." But nowhere before the instant Shortt
decision has an opinion of the court indicated its view on the effect
of a pure covenant not to sue.
In Virginia the common law view was that release of one joint
obligor was the release of all.14 But the view seems to have been
that in the case of a contractual obligation, a covenant not to sue
one co-obligor did not serve to release others.' 5 Today by statute
"a creditor may compound or compromise with any joint contractor
or co-obligor, and release him from all liability on his contract or
obligation, without impairing the contract or obligation as to the
other joint contractors or co-obligors."' 6 In First National Bank v.
Bank of Waverly,17 it was held that this statute left unaffected the
rule regarding joint wrongdoers.
It has been said that different considerations govern the co-
obligor situation as distinguished from that of joint tort-feasors,
since in the case of a contractual obligation it is difficult for the
plaintiff to secure more than one total recovery from among the
obligors, while in the case of an unliquidated tort claim, double or
overlapping recovery is an eminent danger.5 But the simple
expedient of deducting the amount of the first satisfaction from the
amount of the later recovery, as numerous courts do,19 should avoid
that danger.
Elsewhere it has become increasingly accepted as the most equi-
table rule that a covenant not to sue one of two joint tort-feasors
does not release those others responsible. At 45 AM. JUR.,
RELEASE, 676, this rule is spoken of as the "great weight of
authority." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 885 adopts it by stating,
"(2) A covenant not to sue one tort-feasor for a harm does not
discharge any other liable for the harm."
The reason for dissatisfaction with the view now adopted by the
Virginia court has been effectively stated by Mr. Justice Rutledge,
speaking for the court in McKenna v. Austin:2o "The rule's results
are incongruous. More often than otherwise they are unjust
and unintended. Wrongdoers who do not make or share in making
reparations are discharged, while one willing to right the wrong
and no more guilty bears the whole loss. Compromise is stifled,
first, by inviting all to wait for the others, and, second, because
claimants cannot accept less than full indemnity from one when
doing that discharges all. Many, not knowing this, accept less only
to find later that they have walked into a trap. The rule short-
changes the claimant or overcharges the person who settles, as the
recurring volume and pattern of litigation show. Finally, it is
anomalous in legal theory, giving tort-feasors an advantage incon-
sistent with the nature of their liability."
In view of the early attitude of the Virginia court regarding
covenants not to sue among co-obligors, together with the increas-
ing weight of authority on the tort aspect elsewhere and the lack of
binding precedents here, it was to be hoped that the court would
have decided the Shortt case differently from the manner in which
it did. It is submitted that the instant decision exhibits an overdue
respect for an ancient common law doctrine which modem authority
has wisely whittled away with exceptions.
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